South Sudan Power Sharing Agreement

South Sudan Power Sharing Agreement

The foregoing discussion shows the limits of trying to rely too much on the consocialism of power-sharing as a model for conflict resolution, without linking such processes to society as a whole. What is recognized as a “best practice” may not be the right recipe for any ethnic conflict around the world. Institutional weaknesses, lack of trust and lack of conditions conducive to “best practices” are better able to follow the “second best alternative”. That is why our conclusions and recommendations contained in this article state that reducing dependence on formal institutions and individuals in order to resolve the conflict in South Sudan would reduce the incentives for the country to be held captive in the conflict and significantly increase citizens` chances for the peace process and the fate of their country. Several attempts have been made to resolve these internal and border disputes, but such efforts have failed due to unresolved local dysfunctions that have fueled militias and uprisings throughout the country. This has led to what the researchers have called an increase in “organized political movements” and dysfunctional decentralization and exclusionary politics (Roque and Miamingi 2017: 1-5). The August 2015 peace agreement appears to have been doomed to failure. The power-sharing agreement negotiated by IGAD calibrated the distribution of domestic resources as follows: Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) (53%); armed opposition in South Sudan (33%); Former detainees (7%) and other political parties (7%) (IGAD 2015). In addition to power-sharing, consociationalism is based on three other principles: autonomy/autonomy, proportionality and the right of veto. The principle of self-management requires that each fraction of the conflict be granted a certain degree of autonomy. In culturally divided societies, where belligerent groups are concerned with identities, there should be an agreement to have autonomy on matters of cultural interest. Andele Jinadu (1985: 75) notes that this theory also provides a basis for the development and use of mechanisms for the settlement of marital conflicts. However, a conflict resolution mechanism can lead to a policy of affirmative action to consolidate the elite domination of an ethnic class political group.

Several ceasefire agreements were signed and broken during 2014, with millions of civilians displaced as a result of the ensuing violence. The Council and UNMISS can also call on the government to ensure that the armed forces immediately evacuate civilian homes, as required by the power-sharing agreement, she said. She expressed the hope that the Council would reaffirm its support for transitional justice and stated that it should include accountability for gender-based violence. The core organizations need the help of the Security Council in inviting the parties to respect the space for civil society to contribute, she stressed. In the meantime, the Council should assist the people of South Sudan in calling on the parties to keep the hard-won promise of a 35 per cent quota for women`s representation in the transitional government of national unity, she said. It remains essential to maintain all existing provisions on women, peace and security, she stressed, calling on UNMISS to engage with different women`s groups in the country. Uganda has called for a mini-summit with Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda. The purpose of the mini-summit was to assure President Salva Kiir that the provisions with which he disagreed will be removed from the text of the agreement. As part of the agreement, the current cabinet was dissolved in order to remove more members of the opposition….


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